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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
WHITMORE OXYGEN COl\fP ANY,
PZaintiff,

vs.
Case No.
STATE TAX COMl\1ISSION, GRANT
A. BROWN, ELISHA WARNER,
MILTON TWITCHELL and ROSCOE
E. HAl\fMOND,

7154

Defendants.

Defendant's Brief
FACTS
The facts in this case are not in dispute and plaintiff's statement as outlined in its brief is substantially
correct and is adopted by defendants for the purpose of
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this brief. This case was submitted to the Commission
on an agreed statement of facts (Tr. 32-34), which outlines the pertinent facts in greater detail.

QUESTIONS INVOLVED
It is believed that the questions as outlined in plaintiff's brief do not set forth the prohlems herein with
sufficient exactness and, therefore, it is submitted that
the specific questions for determination are as follows:
1.

Does the filing of form TC 71 entitled ''Sales
and Use Tax Return," consisting of two parts
in which entries relating to sales tax have
been made in the sales tax portion of the
form but in which entries have not been made
in the use tax portion of the form, constitute
a use tax return for the purpose of starting
the period of the statute of limitations for
collecting a use tax deficiency determination~

2.

Was the sa:le of personal property evidenced
by the Whitmore-Linde contract an interstate sale, an Indiana sale, or a sale made in
Utah~

3.

If such sale is determined to be an Indiana
sale is the use made by the Whitmore Oxygen
Company of these cylinders exempt pursuant
to the provisions of Title 80-16-4 (d), Utah
Code Annotated, 1943, because subject to the
Gross Income Tax Act of Indiana~

REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT
1. Plaintiff predicates its argument as to the first
question on the fact that it filed form TC 71 with the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Tax Conunission every two months and that each return
was certified to by the company (Tr. 35), and further
contends that the forn1 as filed by it constituted a use
tax return within the meaning of the Use Tax Act.
If the fonns as filed by plaintiff can be considered
to be a return for the purpose of the Use Tax Act, its
contention that the statute of limitations is a good defense, must be conceded. It is the position of defend~nts
that the 4 year statute of limitation applies for the assessment of use tax deficiencies in cases where a use tax
return has been filed. Title 80-16-18, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, allows the Commission to bring an action
at any time within-± years after any person is delinquent
in payment of use tax. While there is no specific statute
of repose with regard to the making or the finding of a
deficiency assessment by the Commission, it is believed
that the only reasonable interpretation of the Act as a
whole would be that the general 4 year statute of limitations (104-2-30, Utah Code Annotated, 1943) applies inasnluch as an action could be brought within this time.
The required contents for use tax purposes is set
forth in Title 80-16-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which
requires the taxpayer to "* * * file with the Commission
/
a return for the preceding bimonthly period in such form
and containing such information as may be prescribed
by the Commission. * * * '' With regard to the use tax,
the Conunission has issued its form TC 71-B entitled
''Instructions,'' and lists the purpose of the combined
return to be as follows:
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''Since a considerable number of retailers
will be required to return to the State the use
tax with respect to certain of their sales, as well
as being subject to the use tax on certain of their
purchases, in addition to being liable for returning sales tax, a combined return has been prepared so that both the sales tax and the use tax
may be reported on one return.''
Items 6 and 7 on form TC 71 filed by the plaintiff
herein ( Tr. 35) are completely blank. Instructions with
regard to Items 6 and 7 reads as follows:
"Item 6. Enter as this item the total sales
price as tangible personal property the storage,
use or other consumption of which, in Utah, is
subject to the use tax. For the most part, this
will include the sales price of property on which
delivery is made from an out-of-state point to
purchasers in Utah which ordinarily would be the
same as Item 13 in the schedule of sales tax deductions. This will also include the sales price of
property, the sale or delivery of which is made at
a place outside of this State if the property is
purchased for storage, use or other consumption
in this State. The use tax does not apply to the
sales price of property the sale of which is subject to a sale or excise tax of this State or any
other state.
"Item 7. Enter as this item, valued at the
sales price, all purchases made by you outside of
Utah or in interstate commerce for storage, use
or consumption by you in this State upon which
the seller has not collected the use tax. For the
most part, this item will include equipment, supplies, merchandise, etc., purchased from out-ofSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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state sellers. It should not include (a) merchandise purchased for resale; or (b) materials which
become an ingredient or component part of tangible personal property to be sold.''
'Yhile it may be true that the filing of a return
containing incorrect infonnation in the absence of fraud
will be sufficient to start the running of the limitation
period, if a ta..,"'(payer fails to furnish any information
with respect to requir~d items as set forth in the instructions, and leaves the form blank as did the plaintiff herein, it is submitted that a return has not been
filed within the meaning and intent of the Use Tax Act.
No direct judicial authority has been found on this
subject and it is believed that there is no reported case
in which this specific question h~s been determined.
However, Federal cases interpreting sections 51 (a), 52,
142 (a), and 187 of the Internal Revenue Code and their
earlier counterparts relating to Federal income tax returns are somewhat analogous. These sections require, as
in prior Revenue Acts, a return ''stating specifically the
items of gross income and the deductions and credits allowed under this title,'' and also ''such other information
for the purpose of this title as the Commission with the approval of the Secretary may by regulations pr~scribe.''
In Florsheim Bros. Dry Goods Company v. United
States (1930) 280 U.S. 453, 460, Mr. Justice Brandeis
speaking for a unanimous court stated:
''The burden of supplying by the return the
information on which assessments were to be
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based was thus imposed on the taxpayers. And,
in providing that the period of limitation should
begin on the date the return was filed, rather
than when it was due, the statute plainly manifested a purpose that the period was to commence only when the taxpayer had supplied this
information in the prescribed manner.''
In Corona Co,al and Coke Co., (1928) 11 B.T.A. 240,
where no information was given except the name and address of the taxpayer, and only. the word "none" was
written at the blank space provided for net income, a similar holding was reached. See also The Jockey Club (1934)
30 B.:T.A. 670, aff'd. without discussion of this point.
(C.C.A. 2d 1935). 76 F. 2d 597 (blank return acc0mpanied
by letter claiming exempt status) ; National Oontnactilng
Co. (1938) 37 B.T.A. 689, aff'd. (C.C.A. 8th 1939) 105
F. 2d 488 (two return forms filed neither of which was
held sufficient); The Joh!n D. Alkire Investment Co. v.
Nicholas (C.C.A. lOth 1940) 114 F. 2d 607 (corporation
return showing no income or deductions, and not disclosing that assets of the corporation had been conveyed
in trust was held not sufficient).
Such cases as Zellerbach Pape.r Co. v. Helverilng
(1934) 293 U.S. 173 cited by the plaintiff and Myles Salt
Co. v. Commissioner (C.C.A. 5th 1931) 49 F. 2d 232, do
establish the rule that perfect accuracy or completeness
.is not necessary to rescue a return from nU'llity. It is to
be noted, however, that in each of these and similar cases,
while the return filed may not have been accurate or
complete it did contain entries of the kind required to
be included in the returns by Federal law.
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Plaintiff herein filed forms upon which the entries
were addressed to but one of two separate tax liabilities,
and it did not comply with the requirements of the Commission's instructions on Form TC 71-B. The plaintiff's
circumstances are thus closely akin to those in the recent
case of Commissioner c. Lane Wells Co. (1944) 321 U.S.
219, 88 L. Ed. 684, wherein it was held that the fi:ling of
an inc01ne tax return upon which a corporation erroneously but in good faith denied it was a personal holding
company would :ilot operate to start the limitation period
against an assessment of the surtax imposed upon personal holding companies, if a separate personal holding
company return w~s not filed. See also McDon!fiAell v.
Unite·d States (Ct. Cl. 1932) 59 F. 2d 29·5 (partnership
filed income tax return, but no excess profits tax return);
Rockland and Rockport Lime Corp. v. Ham (D.C. Maine
1930) 38 F. 2d 239 (corporation filed income tax return
but no excess profits tax return).
It is submitted that the forms filed with the deficiency were insufficient to start the running of a limitation period for use tax deficiency determinations. We
submit that the application of the instructions given in
TC 71-B and the Lane Wells Company case to the instant
case, calls for a negative answer to question No. 1. Plaintiff argues that form TC 71 purports to be on its face
a single return of sales and use tax and points to the
designation and certification on the form to substantiate
its ~position. Such argument, we submit, is beside the
point for clearly the form was addressed to two separate
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tax liabilities. This was made evident by the fact that
the form itself provides 8paces for separate computation
of the sales tax and of the use tax and by specific instructions for Items 1 and 2 for the sales tax, and Items
6 and 7 for the use tax (Tr. 35).
Items 6 and 7 on form TC 71 refers specifically to
instructions ( Tr. 35). Of great significance are these express instructions given to taxpayer wherein the required
content~ of a return for use tax purposes are set forth.
As to the certification, could the plaintiff seriously contend that a completely blank form except for signatures
is a return for sales tax~ It follows that a form containing no information for use tax purposes as required by
law and the instructions of the Commission would be a
nullity with regard to the use tax despite the language of
the certification. This construction is supported by the·
various Federal tax cases heretofore cited since the Federal law required verification of the forms filed and presumably the requirement was followed.
It is submitt~d that the Federal statutes r(lquiring
a return ''stating specifically the items of gross income
and the deductions and credits allowed" are com.parable
to the instructions given by the Commission which require that a return for use tax purposes shall include
"* * * all purchases made by you outside of Utah or in
interstate commerce for storage, use or consumption by
you in this state upon which the seller has not collected
the use tax. * * * '' and '' * * * total purchase price of
tangible personal property purchased for storage, use, or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

other consun1ption in this state on which the seller has
not collected Sales or lh;e Tax." (Item 7-Tr. 35.) The
Federal taxes and the use tax are both based upon self
assessinent and in both instances the purpose is not to
obtain inforn1ation in some form but to obtain it with
uniformity and completeness to facilitate handling and
certification. See Commissioner v. Lane Wells Co., supra.
The use tax i~ compliinentary to the sales tax, but
it is also true that the excess profits tax was complimentary and supplementary to the usual tax on corporation income as was the surtax imposed on personal
holding companies involved in the Lane Wells Co. case.
We submit that the Federal authorities are appropriate here and that the language such as found in the
John D. Alkire Inves tment Co. v. Nicholas (C.C.A. lOth
1

1940) 114 F. 2d 607 at 610, is significant. It is stated
therein:
"The taxpayer no longer contends that the
rentals did not represent gains for which it was
subject to be taxed. Its sole contention now is
that the deficiency assessments were barred by
the statutes of limitations-the three year period
from the filing of the return provided in the Revenue Act of 1926, and the two year period provided in the subsequent acts. That contention
turns upon whether the returns currently made
for the years :ln question were returns within the
meaning of the statutes of limitation.
''Sections 239 and 52, supra, respectively, required every corporation to make a return 'statSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ing specifically the items of its gross income and
the deductions and credits allowed * * *.' The
burden was thus cast upon the taxpayer to furnish
by return the information on which assessments
were to be n1ade. And by providing that the period
of limitation should begin to run from the filing
of the return, the statute Inanifested a clear
legislative intent that the period should begin
only when the taxpayer had furnished such information in the manner prescribed. Florsheim
Bros. Co. v. United States, 280 U.S. 453, 50 S.
Ct. 215, 74 L. Ed. 542.
''Meticulous accuracy, perfect completeness,
or absence of any ommission is not exacted. But
a return which fails to comply in a substantial
degree with the requirements of the statute in
respect to disclosing the requisite information
essential to the making of assessments does not
suffice to start the period of limitation."
Plaintiff indicates in its argument that a different
rule should apply to it because it apparently r..cted in
good faith. This is the precise contention which was made
and rejected in Commission v. Lane Wells Co., supra,
which we have heretofore mentioned. There, as here,
the taxpayer acted in good faith and contended that a
return addressed to but one of its two tax liabilities was
sufficient to answer the purpose of both, but to no
avail.
Plaintiff further argues that this case demonstrates
the harshness of a rule which would allow the Commission to make this deficiency assessment. Plaintiff presumably argues that the policy consideration should abSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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solve it from tax. Such an argument, it is submitted, is
totally without merit, or if it has merit, should be addressed to the Legislature and not to the Court. There·
is in sustaining the defendants position here the sound
principal of preventing unjust discrimination in the application of tax statutes. If taxes may be evaded by the
simple expedient of non payment or failure to make a
return, then the entire revenue system of the stat~ would
be completely disrupted. Especially is this true of the
self assessed taxes of which the use tax is only one. In
all of these taxes the state relies upon the taxpayers to
comply voluntarily with its laws and instructions. If he
does not, the state cannot with any degree of efficiency
and economy maintain a staff of auditors sufficiently
large to ascertain each default. And further, when we
speak of the public we must remember that each member
of the public is to some extent a taxpayer. That which
reduces the tax burden of one merely increases the tax
on others and the benefits received by one individual taxpayer is to the detriment of the remaining taxpayers. In
other words, the basic policy of the state is to secure the
payment of tax and by sound collection policy to prevent
evasion.
Of the thousands of taxpayers who are required to
file form TC 71, the vast majority complete only that
portion of the return which applies to the sales tax. It
is only because some taxpayers are required to file both
sales and use tax that the Commission adopted a combined sales and use tax return. The Commission has conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sistently, since the adoption of form TC 71, taken the
view that where the use tax portion of the return is left
blank that such return does not constitute a return for
use tax purposes. As pointed out by :Mr. Justice Cordoza,
and by plaintiff in its brief on ·page 7, perfect accuracy
is not required. This rule we have applied to the sales
tax portion of plaintiff's return (Tr. 35), wherein certain questions were not answered by taxpayer. However,
it is our position and we believe such position to be substantiated by both Federal cases and long administrative interpretatjon, that some indication must be made
on form TC 71 to apprise the Commission and its auditors
of the fact that the ta:x:payer claims no use tax to be due
or an amount certain to be due.
Plaintiff suggests that "The law does not require a
person to do a useless thing." ·(Plaintiff's brief, page
6.) With this general principal of law, we, of course,
agree. However, we have pointed out that such principal
has no application here. To indicate to the Commission
taxpayer's status wHh regard to the use tax is not a useless act. Some affirmative representation of non-liability
must be made because of the inherent ambiguity existing
if no entry of any kind is made.
Plaintiff points out to the court that the sales tax
and use tax are closely related and the taxpayer cannot
be called upon to distinguish carefully between each
tax separately. This, as a general rule, is also true, and
where it is admitted that one of the two taxes is of
necessity applicable to a transaction, little is to be gained
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by Inaking such distinction. This principal, however, has
absolutely no application in the case now before the
court. It might be applicable if in an audit of the Linde
Air Products Con1pany the question arose as to whether
Linde should return the tax collected, if collected, as a
sales or use tax. In such case it would not be necessary
to distinguish between the taxes. Here, however, it is admitted that '"No sales or use tax has been paid by the
"\Yhitmore Oxygen Company to the state of Utah or any
other state upon said purchase." (Tr. 33.) We take the
position that in view of instructions to Item 7 hereinbefore set forth that taxpayer would have had no difficulty in determining that a u~e tax was due on the purchase of the cylinders.
We submit, therefore, that in view of the foregoing
authorities and arguments that the only reasonable interpretation of the law with regard to the question herein presented is that some affirmative indication must be
made on the combined sa-les and use tax return and that
where the use tax portion of the form is left completely
blank, that such is not sufficient to start the running
of the period of the statute of limitation.
2. Proceeding now to the second question, we must
determine whether the sale of the cylinders herein involved is an interstate sale, an Indiana sale, or a sale
made in Utah. The discussion of plaintiff as to where
title to these cylinders passed is of no consequence. The
passage of title is in no ~vent the taxable incident in this
contract whether it be sales or use tax. The sole reason
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that title passed within the state of Utah, as evidenced
by paragraph 4 of the contract (Tr. 38), was to reserve
title in the vendor until the purchase price was paid in
full.
There is no reported case which has come to counsel's attention holding that the passage of title is the
taxable incident for sales or use tax purposes in a contract wherein title is reserved to insure the payment of
the price. Title 80-16-2 (c), Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
defines ''purchase'' as follows :
"'Purchase' means any transfer, exchange
or barter, conditional or otherwise, in any manner or by any means whatsoever, of tangible personal property for a consideration. A transaction
whereby the possession of property is transferred
but the seller retains the title as security for the
payment of the price shall be deemed a purchase.''
The plaintiff has cited Title 80-15-2 (b), Utah Code
Annotated, 1943, which is a substantially similar provision in the Sales Tax Act. (Plaintiff's brief, page 11.)
Plaintiff concludes :with regard to these provisions that
they '' * * * can affect only the tax basis and not the
tax incident as the tax incident, regardless of where or
when title or possession passes, is the use, storage, or
consumption of property in Utah.''
80-16-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, levies the use
tax '' * * * on the storage, use· or other consumption in
this state of tangible personal property purchased * * *
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for storage, use or other consumption in this state***."
This section further provides that '·Every person storing, using or otherwise consun1ing in this state tangible
personal property purchased shall be liable for the tax
imposed by this act, and the liability shall not be extinguished until the tax has been paid to this state."
Clearly, then, the tax in the instant case is imposed on
the use in Utah and the transfer of possession is a
purchase made by the plaintiff of these cylinders for
use in Utah. It is believed that the controversy with
regard to where the sale herein took place may be settled
simply by pointing out that the use of property purchased here or elsewhere is liable to the use tax unless
specifically exempted.
This court in the case of Southern Bacific Company
v. Utah State T.ax Commission (1944) 150 Pac. 2d 110,
106 Utah 451, at page 455, pointed out that "Unless exempted under the provisions of 80-16-4, of the act or prohibited by constitutional ·provisions, the use, storage, or
other consumption of tangible personal property in Utah,
purchased here or elsewhere is liable to the use tax."
(italics supplied.)
The sales tax and the use tax, as pointed out, are
complimentary and are designed to provide a complete
and comprehensive system of taxation on the purchase
or use of tangible personal property. The tax of 2% must
be paid to the state of Utah upon all tangible personal
property used in this state unless specifica:lly exempted.
It is submitted that even though the sale is to be considSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ered a Utah sale, and inasmuch as it is stipulated by
counsel that no sales or use tax has been paid to the
state of Utah or any other state upon said purchase (Tr.
33), that the sale becomes subjeC't to the use tax. True,
Title 80-16-4 (a), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, contains
words which in typical legislative ambiguity presumably are intended to exempt from the use tax property
which is subject to the sales tax. As to this, we submit
that unless the sales tax is paid either to the state or to
the vendor, the purchase of property made in Utah becomes subject to the use tax.
Be all this as it may, the sale herein involved was
not a sale in Utah but a sale in interstate commerce. The
contract which is an executory contract to sell the cylinders was drafted and signed by the vendor, The Linde
Air Products Company, at its New York office. This is
clearly evidenced by the letterhead on which the contract is written. (Tr. 36)
The Linde Air products Company in submitting the
contract to the Whitmore Oxygen Company indicated the
terms and conditions of sale and required that Whitmore
Oxygen Company '' * * * confirm your accep1tance of the
foregoing terms and conditions by signing a copy of this
letter and returning to us, whereupon it shall ccnstitute
a contract between us." (Tr. 39) This contract w:as
accepted by plaintiff and returned as instructed, whereupon it became a binding contract to sell.
No com·prehensive definition of interstate commerce
is possible. The essential characteristic of interstate comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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merce is the cro:-;:::~ing of 8tate lines. Interstate commerce
includes negotiation8 for the sale of goods lo<:ated in
another state. The Supreme Court of the United States
in recognizing the uncertainty as to what constitutes an
interstate sale, held that "The negotiation of sales of
goods which are in another state, for the purpose of introducing them into the state in which the negotiations
are n1ade, is interstate commerce,'' which ''cannot be
taxed at all'' to outside sellers or their agents. Robbilns
r. Shelby County Tax Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 7 S. Ct. 592.
The contract is silent as to where delivery of the
cylinders took place. An interpretation of such a contract requires an exainination of all of the terms of the
contract provisions, the conduct of the parties, usages
of trade and the circumstances of the case. (81-2-2 (2),
Utah Code Annotated, 1943.) The contract herein quotes
the purchase price of said cylinders "f.o.b. our manufacturing plant at Speedway, Indiana." (Tr. 36) The
essence of an f.o.b. transaction is that title to and possession of goods are turned over from the seller to the buyer
at the time and place that the goods are turned over
from the seller to the carrier. When this event occurs
the carrier becomes the agent of the buyer and the latter
must pay the freight to point of destination. The fact
that the record is silent as to where and when possession of the goods was taken and as to payment of freight
charges is believed not material herein. The contract was
available and required the same interpretation immediately after the transaction was completed as it now requires.
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While the intention of the parties wth regard to
pas age of title is not governed by a provision to deliver
f.o.b. point of shipment, such provision can and does
affect de'livery and transfer of possession although titleis retained as security for payment of the purchase price.
An analogous situation, we believe, is where the express
retention of title by the seller, in a contract of sale in
order to secure payment of the purchase price, does not
prevent its passing under an f.o.b. provision at the point
of shipment for the purpose of a suit by the seller to
recover the purchase price. Kilmer vs. Moneyweight
Scale Co., 36 Ind. App. 568, 76 NE 271. Likewise we believe that the only interpretation which can be placed
upon the f.o.b provision involved herein is that possession ,
to the goods passed and delivery occurred at Speedway,
Indiana.
Plaintiff makes reference to certain of the contract provisions as being helpful in determining the intent of the
parties as to whether the transaction was an Indiana or
Utah sale. Special reference is made to paragraph 8 of
the contract (Tr. 39. Plaintiff's brief, page 11). This
paragraph has to do with the contract being interpreted
and governed by the laws of Utah. While careful drafting of the contract might require the inclusion of such
a provision, it is submitted that sufficient doubt existed
as to whether this contract was a Utah contract, one in
interstate commerce, or an Indiana contract that the
draftsman considered it necessary to clarify the law by
which such contract should be governed. As pointed out
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
heretofore, the contract was sent frmn New York, accepted in Utah by plaintiff herein, and returned to New
York whereupon it became binding as a contract to sell.
Plaintiff cites Lazcso·n v. Tripp, 34 Utah 28, 95 P.
3:20, as establishing the rule that "In the absence of contrary agreements or circu1nstances when no place of perfonnance is fixed by a contract, it wiU be presumed that
the contract is to be performed where made." (Plaintiff's
brief, page 12.) Conceding this to be the law, we submit
that such has no application here. By the express terms
oi the contract the vendor, Linde Air Products Company,
had the responsibility only of delivering the cylinders
free on board at its manufacturing plant, Speedway,
Indiana. T.here is nothing in the contract which imposes
any further duty of performance upon Linde Air Products Company. We find no provision in the contract
which, as plaintiff points out, "* * * provides expressly
that designated portions shall be performed at the place
of contracting.'' Conditions imposed upon the vendee,
i.e., keeping cylinders in good order, not to sell, mortgage or dispose of or permit any lien or charge to attach against said cylinders, (paragraph 5 of contract, Tr.
39); assumption of risk of loss of cylinders (paragraph
6 of contract, Tr. 39); assumption of personal injury
claims (paragraph 7 of contract, Tr. 39), cannot he interpreted as performance in Utah on the part of the
vendor. True, the vendor reserves the right to. repossess
the cylinders and sell them at private or public sale
upon default, and they further agree to deliver a bill of
sale when the cylinders have been fully paid for under the
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provisions of the contract (Tr. 38). However, such pro,.
visions we submit cannot be considered as portions of
the contract to be performed at the place of contracting.
Plaintiff further makes reference to the provision of
the contract (paragraph 2, Tr. 38-Plaintiff's brief, page
12), wherein Whitmore agrees t.o pay"* * * on demand
the amount of any sa:les, use or other excise tax, which
we may be required to pay in connection with the cylinders delivered hereunder." And concludes that, "If,
however, the sale was intended to be an Indiana sule * * *,
and one in interstate commerce, Linde could have no
liability and the contract provision is meaningless.'' Such
conclusion, we submit, is erroneous. The Linde Air Products Company having an agent in Utah and being
authorized to do business within this state as a foreign
corporation (paragraph 2, Stipulation of Facts, Tr. 32)
would be required to collect and remit use tax to the
state of Utah on sales made by it in interstate commerce.
See Montgomery Ward & Co., v. State Tax Commission,
(1941) 100 Utah 222, 112 Pac. 2d 152.
Plaintiff cites the case of Commonwealth ·of Penn v.
Witoil Corporation, 316 Pa. 33, 173 Atl. 404, 101 A.L.R.
287, as being clearly in point and nearly identical in fact.
This case is distinguishable upon three grounds.
(a) The vendor and vendee were both located in
the state of Pennsylvania. Wiloil Corporation was a
Pennsylvania corporation with its principal office and
place of business in the state of Pennsylvania. The
vendee to whom the gasoline was sold (Ace Oil CorSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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poration and the High Power Gasoline Co.) were both
from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. All of the gasoline
was sold by \Viloil Corporation ;s agent in Phih1delphia
to the two COinpanies named. "\Vhereas, in this case,
while the vendor, The Linde Air Products Company,
is qualified to do business in Utah, the contract here
involved was not drafted in Utah, but was drafted
in the X ew York office of the Linde Air Products Con1pany and 1nailed to Whitmore Oxygen Company in this
state.
(b) A second and more definite distinction i.s
that the court in the \Viloil Corporation case assumed
the fact that the sale was actually made in Pennsylvania and the determination which the court was called
upon to make was where title to the gasoline passed. It
was contended that by the f.o.b. provision alone, the
title passed at Wilmington, Delaware, and the court
held that the f.o.b. provision was merely a price fixing
provision. That this was a price fixing provision was
shown by the fact that plaintiff's invoice, which was
offered in evidence, contained a specific refe:rence to
tax as follows: "Price 51hc gal. f.o.b. Wilmington, Del.
plus 3c tax.'' Furthermore, in this case there was
testimony by the secretary and treasurer of the Wiloil
Corporation that it was the practice to sell gasoline
f.o. b. certain places in order to fix the price. The transaction was compared to the custom of the automobile
trade, wherein the price was quoted f.o.b. place of
manufacture. We submit that there is nothing in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
record nor any assertion made to show that it is the
custom in selling acetylene cylinders to quote prices
f.o.b. place of manufacture.
(c) A_ third distinction is that the tax involved
in the Wiloil Corporation case is a gasoline tax which
is a tax upon the first sale of gasoline within the state
and is imposed upon the vendor. Whereas, the tax in
this case is a use tax which may or may not be imposed
upon the vendor which fact gives rise to extreme difference in the contract provisions in the two cases.
The court stated with regard to this proposition:
"If the parties contemplated that the title
passed at Wilmington, Del., outside of Pennsylvania, and the gasoline there belonged to the purchasers, it is difficult to understand how the
seller could have regarded itself as in any way
liable for a Pennsylvania tax. * * * The sale and
delivery of the gasoline occurred in Philadelphia.
The fact that appellant secured the gasoline in
Wilmington for the purpose of performing its
contract was incidental. It was not contemplated
by the agreement of sale that the gasoline be procured in Wilmington or any other particular
place. The contract could have been as well performed had it been procured by appellant in Pennsylvania. Taxation of the sale or delivery of the
gasoline by appellant to its purchasers only remotely and indirectly affects interstate commerce.''
It becomes readily appar~nt that there are clearly
distinguishable differences between the contract of sale
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involved in the "\Viloil Corporation case and in the case
now before the court, and said case cannot be relied upon
to sustain plaintiff's position.
Now, therefore, in view of the definition of ''purchase," Title 80-16-2 (c), Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
and in view of the f.o.b. provision, it is submitted that
this contract n1ust be interpreted to be one to sell property in interstate commerce or a sale made in Indiana,
and that inasmuch as Whitmore purchased these cylinders for use in Utah, that the use tax and not the
sales tax applies to said purchases.
3. In the event the sale is determined to be an Indiana sale, the third contention of plaintiff that the purchase is specifically exempt pursuant to provision 8016-4 (d), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, may be summarily
dealt with. Plaintiff's indication, set forth in its brief on
page 15, that there is ample authority that a transaction
such as the Whitmore-Linde sale is not taxable in Indiana, is correct. An examination of the Indiana Gross
Income Tax Act (Acts of Indiana, 1933, ch. 50), (Burns
Ind. Statutes Annotated, 1933, sec. 64, 2601-64-2630),
as amended, as such tax act was in effect during the
years in question, and the cases decided thereunder indicates clearly that such transaction was not subject to
the Indiana tax. See J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. W~lliam
Svoren (1937) 304 U.S. 307, 82 L. Ed. 1365, which held,
as set forth in the syllabus, that:
''A state gross income tax (Indiana Gross
Income Tax Act of 1933) imposes an unconstitu-
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tional burden on interstate and foreign commerce
when applied to the gross receipts of a corporation which, although its factory and principal
place of business is within the state, sells most of
its products to customers in other states and
foreign countries, where the tax is imposed on the
total gross receipts of the corporation, whether
fron1 business within or without the state, indiscrilninately and without apportionment."
It is believed, however, that such is not the solution to
the problem presented. As indicated by plaintiff, the Tax
Cornmission has long interpreted the words ''subject
to" as found in Title 80-16-4 (d), Utah Code Annotated,
1943, as meaning ''subject to and actually paid.'' This,
we submit, is a practical and in fact the only effective interpretation which can be placed upon this section. Insisting that sales tax actually be paid to a sister state is
the only method by which the Tax Commission can determine with certainty and definiteness that the ~ale was
subject to the tax in another state.
The Tax Commission cannot be called upon to interpret aU of the laws of the various states which impose a sales tax upon sales of tangible personal property.
The exemption exempting property upon which a tax
already has been paid to another state is indeed a wise
and equitable exemption. Such provision eliminates the
possibility of interstate commerce being subjected to an
unfair burden. If, however, a tax is not paid to a sister
state, the transaction is not in fact subjected to such discrimination but is put upon the same basis as sales made
in intrastate commerce. It is admittedly true that a 1nisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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interpretation of the statute gives no regularity to such
interpretation. However, this court in the case of Board
of Sta:fte Land Commissioners v. Ririe, (1920) 56 Utah
213, 190 P. 59, said:
· · \Yhile it is true that the construction of a
statute by the executive ·department is not binding upon the courts, it is, nevertheless, a]so true,
and is so determined by the overwhelming weight
of authority, that unless such construction does
violence to the apparent intent of the language
used it is entitled to serious consideration by the
courts, and especially so if the statute has been
in force for any great length of time and has been
so construed.''
This state1nent of the law was acquiesced in by this court
in In re Cou·an's Estate, (1940) 98 U. 393, 99 Pac. 2d
605, and was reaffirmed in the case of Utah Concrete
Products Co. v. Sta.te Tax Commission, (1942) 101 U.
513, 125 P. 2d 408.
The interpretation placed by the State Tax Commis- ·
sion upon the words ''subject to'' has been in effect
since 1937 when the Use Tax Act was first passed. And
it is submitted such interpretation does no violence to
the apparent intent of the language, the intent being to
eliminate the possibility that both a sales and use tax
would be paid on the same transaction.
In view of the impossibility of the Commission determining whether another state l~w subjects a sales
transaction to tax and the fact that the Commission has
long held that the tax must be paid to a sister state in or-
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der for the transaction to be exempt here, it is submitted
that the contention of plaintiff as to question three be
held for naught and the position of the Tax Commission
sustained.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion the defendant, State Tax Com1nission,
respectfully submits that in view of the authorities cited
and the arguments presented herein that this court should
deny petitioner's claim that the filing of form TC 71 entitled ''Sales and Use Tax Return'' in which the use tax
portion of the return was left blank is a return sufficient to start the running of the period of the statute
of limitation, and this court should likewise deny the
petitioner's claim that the Whitmore-Linde contract evidences a sale made in Utah, and the defendant further
submits that in view of the long standing interpretation
of Title 80-16-4 (a), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, that
this court should deny petitioner's claim that if a sale
is subject to a tax, that such sale is exempt irrespective
of the fact that no tax is paid to the other state.
WHEREFORE, defendants pray that the decision
heretofore rendered by the Tax Commission in this
matter be affirmed and judgment rendered accordingly.
Respectfully submited,
G. HAL TAYLOR,
Attorney for Defendants.
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